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THE JET LAG THEORY OF PURGATORY 
A d a m Green 
Models of purgatory tend to come paired with an operative conception of 
what perfection consists in. In the recent philosophical literature, two models, 
the satisfaction model and the sanctification model, have been pitted against 
one another. The former focuses on innocence before the law and makes pur-
gatory out to be a place where a debt of punishment is paid. The latter focuses 
on moral character and describes purgatory in terms of character formation. 
If perfection consists in a certain way of being related to God, however, then 
there is a third model (or perhaps a particular way of developing the second 
model) that merits our attention that focuses on relational dynamics. 
In a recent book, Jerry Walls argues for a version of the doctrine of pur-
gatory that he takes to be philosophically robust and also friendly to 
Protestant sensibilities. 1 He considers views on which purgatory is a place 
where guilt is punished 2 and views on which one completes the unfin-
ished project of sanctification, siding with the latter against the former. 
In this paper, I explore a way of thinking about purgatory that either falls 
outside of Walls's taxonomy or else forces one to add to it. I w i l l not argue 
that this new way of thinking about purgatory is true or even that it is 
probable if one assumes the core tenets of Christianity. Instead, what I w i l l 
argue is that, if we should think there is some intermediate state between 
earth and heaven, the theory I w i l l offer is an attractive vision of such a 
state that deserves to be explored alongside the more conventional ways 
of thinking about purgatory. 
A n y theory of purgatory w i l l draw a distinction between the final state 
of the blessed in heaven and an intermediate state that some or all of 
the people who end up enjoying that final state w i l l inhabit prior. The 
intermediate state is impoverished relative to the final state but is not 
equivalent to being damned. It is supposed to somehow be a state such 
•Jerry Walls, Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation (New York: Oxford Universi ty 
Press, 2012). 
2 Walls notes that one can make a distinction between guilt and "the debt of punishment" 
(Walls, 21). I w i l l be using the term guilt throughout in explicating the satisfaction view, but, 
if one is convinced that there is a distinction here and that it makes a difference, one can 
substitute the terms without it affecting the argument. 
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that the people who inhabit it have a trajectory that intends them for the 
final state of blessedness in heaven even though they either do not enjoy it 
yet or do not enjoy it fully. Where accounts of purgatory can diverge is in 
their delineation of why the intermediate state is required, how this inter-
mediate state differs f rom damnation and beatitude,3 and what condition 
needs to be fulf i l led in order to move one f rom purgatory to a final state 
of blessedness. 
A view of purgatory centered on punishment, what Walls calls a satis¬
faction model, w i l l be one on which people must go to purgatory because 
the sins committed in their earthly life need to be punished. There is a con¬
ceptual similarity in the rationale for both hell and purgatory on this view, 
namely, the notion that sin cannot go unpunished. Purgatory and hell 
differ conceptually, however, in the duration of punishment, the nature 
of the people who are admitted to each, and perhaps the severity of the 
punishment endured. One might think, for instance, that people in purga-
tory have only venial sins to purge whereas the denizens of hell w i l l have 
committed mortal sins as well . People in purgatory w i l l have "done their 
time" at some point, but, on the traditional view of hell at least, people in 
hell w i l l stay there. Ultimately, on this view of purgatory, people get out of 
purgatory when they have endured whatever punishment fits what they 
are being punished for (excepting prayers for the dead or indulgences as 
a means of expediting the process). 
A view of purgatory centered on sanctification, like that of Walls, can 
account for things a bit differently. Someone with this view need not 
posit that guilt is being atoned for. Rather, heaven is a place where only 
perfect people can go, and, whatever progress we make i n sanctification 
before death, we w i l l not be perfect when we die. O n this view then, pur¬
gatory is a k ind of finishing school where the problems in oneself that 
were not already worked out in life are solved. The difference between the 
damned and those in purgatory is that those i n purgatory are suffering 
in the service of becoming worthy of heaven. They need not be suffering 
as a punishment, but rather, they are being made better people. Once all 
the imperfections are worked out, those in purgatory can enter heaven. 
The suffering of the damned does not, in contrast, make them any more 
worthy on the usual way of thinking about hell. A t best, perhaps it acts as 
a check against further moral and spiritual decline. 4 
As Neal Judisch points out, a complicating factor for a taxonomy put 
in terms of satisfaction and sanctification models is that "satisfaction" has 
at least sometimes been used to convey something that is equivalent to 
3 Even someone who held a version of universalism on which there is no such thing as hell 
and that all w i l l , in effect, go to purgatory, should want a way of distinguishing between the 
concepts of hell and purgatory such that the claim that there is no such place as hell has a 
distinct content f rom the claim that there is no such place as purgatory. 
4 Cf . Eleonore Stump's discussion of Satan's role in the Job story for how such an account 
of hell might go. Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering 
(New York: Oxford Universi ty Press, 2010), 177-226. 
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sanctification. 5 One might think that "sanctification" emphasizes the posi¬
tive aspect of the process of growing towards a perfected state whereas 
"satisfaction" emphasizes the fact that the maimed parts of human nature 
need to go through a painful process of healing that cannot be skipped 
over. I w i l l fo l low Walls's terminology, 6 but it should be borne in mind that 
talk of "satisfaction" does not entail that a given source has what Walls is 
calling a satisfaction model. 
Why might one think that Walls's taxonomy inadequately canvasses all 
the options as it stands? Sometimes one has to go through an uncomfort¬
able process not because of some structural defect in oneself but rather 
because one needs to acclimate to a new context. If one walks f rom a dimly 
lit room into a brightly lit one, then it w i l l take a second before one is able 
to take advantage of the better lighting conditions of one's new environ¬
ment. The darker the room f rom which one has come and the brighter the 
room into which one is moving, the longer and more uncomfortable w i l l 
be one's time of acclimation. This effect need not be the result of any defect 
in one's eyes. Rather, it is the result of moving f rom a suboptimal context 
into an optimal one. 
The fol lowing case w i l l map neatly onto the view I want to propose. 
JET L A G : Christian, Patrick, and Daniel all receive invitations to come 
on an all-expense-paid vacation to a certain Bahaman island. Christian 
and Patrick accept, and Daniel turns the invitation down, choosing in¬
stead to vacation in a dark, gloomy corner of Siberia. Christian travels 
three time zones i n order to get to the island, and Patrick travels eight. 
O n day one of their vacation, Christian enjoys his vacation more than 
Patrick, whose enjoyment surpasses Daniel's. A s the days progress, 
however, the ability of Christian and Patrick to take in the goodness of 
the island increases and the difference between them narrows. Eventu¬
ally, both Christian and Patrick w i l l get over their jet lag and w i l l enjoy 
the island equally in contrast wi th Daniel's continuously miserable Si¬
berian holiday. 
The basic idea is that purgatory is like the state of being jet-lagged. It 
arises f rom the disparity in the goodness of heaven and earth. It is not so 
much a distinct place (or needn't be) as it is the state of new arrivals in 
heaven. In order to posit a need for acclimation to the goodness of heaven, 
one need not posit an undischarged debt that must be paid or a need 
to put in the blood and sweat necessary to form the moral dispositions 
one d id not form on earth. One need only posit that there is a significant 
difference between the mode of being that is available on earth and that 
available in heaven, and that when someone enters the afterlife, her own 
5 N e a l Judisch, "Sanctification, Satisfaction, and Purgatory," Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009), 
167-185. 
6See also Justin Barnard, "Purgatory and the Di lemma of Sanctification," Faith and Phi-
losophy 24 (2007), 311-330. 
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mode of being is continuous enough wi th that had on earth to require a 
time of adjustment. One can claim that the degree of jet lag is related to 
one's sinfulness on earth, but fundamentally, the jet lag metaphor offers 
one a different k ind of model for thinking about an intermediate state. 
It forces one either to add another category alongside sanctification and 
satisfaction models or else to subdivide sanctification models into those 
that emphasize what one might call Aristotelian virtues and others that 
emphasize the relational realization of perfective qualities. 
A concept of purgatory cannot be independent of an operative concep¬
tion of what human perfection consists in . Purgatory just is that which 
purges the soul of imperfection. If one thinks of perfection as innocence 
relative to God's commands, then punishment is what fits a lack of perfec¬
tion. The debtor who has paid his debts is once again innocent before the 
law. If one thinks of perfection in Aristotelian terms as the possession of 
a set of right dispositions trained into one through habituation, then the 
proper response to imperfection is more habituation, more training. 
What if, however, our notion of perfection is that of the fulfil lment of a 
whole-hearted desire for union with God? Suppose that this state d id not 
only encapsulate what human happiness consists in, but that this state 
also was the very thing that perfects a human being. If one thinks of per¬
fection in terms of intimacy with the divine because, for instance, G o d 
just is the Good, then the proper response to imperfection is interacting 
with G o d at the level and to the extent that one is capable in an effort to 
grow that intimacy into a more mature form. Habits are formed to be sure, 
but to focus on the habituation of the human agent alone in this context 
is to miss the point. A n imperfect relationship with G o d is solved in and 
through God's presence, not the building up of one's inner resources for 
doing the right thing under one's own power. This is not to say that, to 
count as a sanctification model, one must aff irm that purgatory is a matter 
of building up one's inner resources in this manner. It is, however, to em¬
phasize that the nature of sanctification can be parsed in terms that differ 
enough to generate very different looking models. Even if one posits that 
G o d gives one the strength to achieve the necessary habituation, being 
an indirect cause of perfective habituation is quite different f rom being a 
cause of growth through interpersonal relationship. 
The jet lag model draws some support f rom some of the general 
features of the Thomistic worldview, even if it may be out of step wi th 
many of the things Aquinas says specifically about purgatory. Aquinas 
parts ways wi th Aristotle by claiming that true virtue is infused by G o d 7 
and that human perfection is underwritten by relational properties that 
one bears to G o d because G o d just is "the Good ." 8 Unl ike Aristotle, for 
7 Aquinas , Thomas. Summa Theologiae. www.newadvent.org/summa. ST 1a2ae, q63, a.2. 
8 For a relational account of Aquinas's ethics, see A n d r e w Pinsent, The Second-Person Per-
spective in Aquinas' Ethics: Virtues and Gifts (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
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Aquinas true virtue comes to one at once through the gift of relationship 
wi th God . 9 
Thus, for Aquinas, someone entering the afterlife having a right re¬
lationship wi th G o d should not need further practice to acquire virtue. 
Virtue has already been infused in h im or her. The appropriation of these 
infused excellences takes time, however. The infused virtues can coexist 
wi th imperfections and limitation. 1 0 So long as one is, in fact, one of the 
relata, G o d underwrites the perfective quality of the relation, and, i n this 
life, not every imperfection negates one's standing in these perfective 
relations to the divine. That is, after all, why there is supposed to be a 
distinction between mortal and venial sins. It would be consistent wi th 
a general Thomistic outlook, then, to think of purgatory as that state of 
being in which the infused virtues come gradually to have their f u l l effect 
in a context free f rom the limitations of a fallen world. 
It may be possible to see the outworking of infused virtues as similar 
to the acquiring of virtues that are not infused, especially if there is room 
for playing an active part in entering more deeply into them, but at some 
point, there w i l l be a definitive difference. A n Aristotelian virtue is a dis¬
position seated in the individual , and whatever role others may play in 
creating a friendly environment, it is a disposition acquired through re¬
peatedly exercising the w i l l in the way it w i l l eventually be disposed. The 
infused virtue, arguably, is one where the seat of the disposition to act well 
is in the relation. G o d plays the most important role i n underwriting the 
relation, and even if there may be some state of the w i l l that is a necessary 
condition on the obtaining of the relation (or on its not failing to obtain), 
the infused virtue's effect is a matter of being acted on rather than of prac¬
ticing something until it becomes second nature. Act ing i n line with the 
way one has been acted on by the divine may replicate some of the Aristo¬
telian habituation process, but the overall picture is quite different. 
The view I am trying to describe would invert a typical picture of pur¬
gatory as a place where one is attempting to become good enough to enter 
into God's presence. O n the jet lag model, God's presence is not what is 
withheld f rom one until one becomes perfect but what perfects one. In¬
stead of a place of punishment or a place i n which one gets repetitions 
doing the right thing, imagine a day care center for people wi th develop¬
mental delays in social cognition. Interpersonal exchanges are simplified 
and given at the pace that a child can receive. The hope and expectation 
is that the delayed children w i l l be able to enter more advanced and ful¬
filling relationship, but care is extended at the level it can be received. 
Suppose further that these developmental delays were not caused by the 
predeterminations of genetics but rather arose f rom being raised under 
impoverished social conditions. Having endured trauma, the children 
9 Cf . Aquinas ST 1a2ae, q65, a.3 and q. 71, a. 4. 
1 0 Aquinas ST 1a2ae, q. 71, a.4. 
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need time to be able to acclimate to and embrace the benefits of their cur¬
rent position fully. 
In sum, then, on the jet lag view, purgatory is necessary because of the 
discrepancy between the goodness available on earth and that available 
in heaven. It takes time to grow into the opportunities for unimpeded 
relationship with G o d that are available in heaven. If this is painful, it is 
the pain of recovering f rom the trauma of l iv ing in a fallen wor ld and not 
that of being punished for sins that should already have been atoned for 
or making the choices necessary to train into oneself dispositions to act 
rightly. It is over as soon as one has acclimated to one's new context. 
Before moving on to compare the merits of the jet lag view and alter-
natives, let us briefly distinguish the proposal f rom one given by D a v i d 
Vander Laan. The "heavenly sanctification account" given by Vander Laan 
claims that there is no such thing as purgatory. 1 1 Imperfect believers go to 
heaven. God, however, ensures that the actual wor ld is not one i n which 
these imperfect people sin in heaven through the use of middle knowledge 
and other kinds of knowledge regarding the dispositions of these persons 
that can play the same functional role as middle knowledge. 1 2 Imperfect 
persons in heaven are not put in a position where they w i l l fail , and this 
allows them to enjoy heaven while finishing their sanctification. 
O n both my proposal and that of Vander Laan, persons begin their 
afterlife i n heaven who would not be entering heaven upon death on a 
satisfaction or a sanctification model wi th more Aristotelian leanings. It 
is also true that on both proposals the final state of the person in heaven 
emerges over time. The difference between the proposals is that the 
growth present in the jet lag case is fundamentally relational, and there is 
an organic connection between how heaven is experienced and the need 
for growth. In contrast, it is consistent wi th Vander Laan's account that the 
experience of heaven has no organic connection with the area in which 
growth is required. 1 3 A promissory note has been taken out on one of the 
qualifications for being in heaven, but because G o d has guaranteed that 
one w i l l eventually finish the sanctifying work that was started on earth, 
one is provided with the fruits of it before all the qualifications are filled. 
Why, one might wonder, is it even important to finish sanctification if G o d 
can use his middle knowledge to ensure that one enjoys heaven without 
it? Insofar as Vander Laan has an answer to this question, it is that there is 
value i n the "free self-direction of character," that is, in "free postmortem 
action that contributes to the agent's moral development." 1 4 In contrast, 
the growth that lies at the heart of the jet lag account has nothing to do 
with the value of choosing to be a virtuous person per se. It is, rather, just 
1 1 D a v i d Vander Laan, "The Sanctification Argument for Purgatory," Faith and Philosophy 
24 (2007), 331-339. 
1 2 Ibid. , 331-332. 
1 3 O f course, Vander Laan could add to his account to make it more relational. 
1 4 Vander Laan, 337. 
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that capacitation which is necessary to enter fu l ly into the good of relating 
with G o d in intimate communion. 
Having outlined the basic idea and distinguished the view f rom the 
nearest view in the literature, I w i l l explore how one might argue for the 
jet lag view as an alternative over a pure satisfaction model or a more 
Aristotelian sanctification model. 
II 
Keeping Hell and Purgatory Separate 
I take it that it would be a substantive revision of the tradition if one were 
to collapse the difference between purgatory and hell and that the differ-
ence in k ind between the concept of each is supposed to be reflected in 
who goes to these places and what happens to them i n each place. When 
the idea of purgatory was introduced, the idea wasn't that hell might be 
more permeable than was previously thought, for instance. O n the jet 
lag theory, the people in purgatory share wi th the blessed the essential 
property that qualifies one for the final state of blessedness, a loving re-
lationship wi th God . The damned don't have that. The suffering of the 
damned is the suffering of people not in a relationship with the source 
of all goodness, and one could argue that it is that lack of relationship in 
which their suffering consists. To the extent that those in purgatory suffer, 
it is because their capacity to take advantage of the bliss available to them 
is still growing, and they know that they lack the fu l l measure of the good¬
ness available to them. 
O n rival views, there is an unnerving similarity between what goes on 
in hell and what goes on in purgatory. Walls quotes Dorothy Sayers as 
addressing this point as follows. 1 5 
The sole transforming difference [between purgatory and hell] is in the men-
tal attitude of the sufferers. Dante has grasped the great essential which is 
so often overlooked in arguments about penal reform, namely, the prime 
necessity of persuading the culprit to accept judgment. 1 6 
If the sole difference is one of attitude, it is notable what the difference 
is not. If Sayers is right, then the difference between what happens in pur-
gatory and hell is not a difference in the pains endured by the denizens of 
these two realms but in how they relate to those pains. 
Consider first the satisfaction view. O n the satisfaction view, both those 
in hell and those in purgatory are punished for wrongdoing. Punishment 
is the activity that defines each place, and both places are defined as places 
that wrongdoers belong in the afterlife. It's not clear what one would lose 
by asserting that everyone is sent to hell to be punished after they die. 
Some w i l l just be released later. Those in purgatory go to some place that's 
1 5 The quotation comes f rom Dorothy Sayers, "Introduction," The Divine Comedy II: Purga¬
tory, trans. Dorothy Sayers (London: Penguin, 1955), 15. 
1 6 Walls , 74. 
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very hard to distinguish f rom hell in terms of what goes on there.1 7 One 
could posit some sort of essential difference in k ind concerning the k ind 
of punishment that goes on, but it's not clear how one would underwrite 
that difference using the model. 
The problem wi th an Aristotelian version of the sanctification view 
is a little more subtle. If purgatory is, by definition, the place where im¬
perfect people are made perfect through habituation, then one wants to 
know why people move only up and not down. Why is there a boundary 
between hell and purgatory such that people in purgatory don't end up 
habituating in the wrong direction, even ending up i n hell? One way of 
answering this problem would be to appeal to the traditional idea that 
people i n heaven can't choose anything but the good. This won't work in 
this case, however, because the most plausible interpretation of that tradi¬
tional idea is that the people i n question can't sin because their character 
has been perfected. It would be inconsistent wi th their character to sin. 1 8 
O n the sanctification view, however, it is exactly the imperfection of char-
acter that leads to one being in purgatory in the first place. What, then, is 
to keep people in purgatory f rom becoming more imperfect? 1 9 
Walls entertains an objection identical to or very close to this one. 2 0 He 
asks why it should be that souls cannot come to be damned in the afterlife 
if they can repent and reform themselves in the afterlife. His answer is that 
there is an asymmetry between choosing the good and choosing against 
the good. 
Walls makes his case as follows. 
N o w I am inclined to think that it is possible but unl ikely that persons who 
die in grace but need purgatory would turn completely away f rom G o d after 
death and be lost. The fundamental reason is because there are deep differ¬
ences between the choice for G o d and the choice against h im. There are far 
deeper and more intelligible motivations for choosing G o d than for choos¬
ing against h im, and these make the former choice far more stable in the 
long run. Indeed, the radical asymmetries between the two choices are such 
that there is good reason to think the choice for G o d is not reversible in the 
same sense that the choice against h i m is . 2 1 
1 7 Cf . Aquinas ST, appendix II, article 2. 
1 8 Cf . T i m Pawl and K e v i n Timpe, "Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free W i l l in Heaven," Faith 
and Philosophy 26 (2009), 396-417. 
1 9 The proponent of the sanctification view could, of course, make G o d a k ind of Frank-
furt ian intervener. If someone in purgatory were to be on the verge of doing something that 
wou ld make her more imperfect, G o d could override her w i l l , causing her to do nothing. 
Thus, someone in purgatory wou ld be guaranteed to improve only through habituation and 
the use of her free w i l l , and it wou ld not be possible for her character to degenerate in pur¬
gatory. Walls relies heavily on incompatibilist intuitions about the value of a freely chosen 
character in motivating his model of purgatory, and an appeal to Frankfurt ian intervention 
wou ld be an odd fit in his view. Exactly how artificial one finds this solution, however, w i l l 
l ikely depend on one's broader convictions concerning the free w i l l debate. 
2 0 Walls , 147-149. 
2 1 Ibid. , 148. 
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I am wil l ing to grant Walls all the points he makes in this passage. What 
may easily escape one's notice, though, is that Walls does, in fact, grant 
that people who are saved in this life can make a choice in the afterlife 
that sends them to hell. It is surely true that it is hard to get one's mind 
around why one would make a choice against G o d if one has died and 
found oneself in purgatory. Finding oneself in purgatory surely confers 
what John Hick called "eschatological verification" on one's belief in G o d 
and the gospel. 2 2 In short, if one has made it to purgatory, one now knows 
better than to doubt or rebel. It is a traditional, if somewhat mystifying, 
doctrine within Christianity, however, that a third of the angels made a 
choice against G o d despite knowing that G o d exists and knowing quite 
a bit about what G o d is like. The asymmetry between choosing the good 
and choosing against it lessens the cost to be paid if one admits that one 
can worsen one's condition in purgatory, even becoming damned, but it is 
still a significant cost. 
Personal Identity and the Transformative Nature of the Afterlife 
One of the more provocative arguments that Walls gives on behalf of 
purgatory concerns personal identity. Walls's idea is that the afterlife is 
supposed to involve the very same people who die, not new people who 
bear a certain resemblance to the people who have died. There should, 
therefore, be substantial continuity between the properties of the person 
who dies and the post-mortem being that is said to be identical wi th the 
person who has died. Without a period of transition between one's earthly 
state of being and one's final state of blessedness i n heaven, one might 
worry that personal identity is not respected. 2 3 
To see the point, consider an example. Suppose one is watching a 
movie, and Bob is a character who is prideful, cowardly, and vengeful. 
He is a hunchback, gets hungry, and has atrocious taste in music. Bob 
vanishes f rom the screen and a moment later Bob* appears. Bob* is in 
some respects similar to Bob, but Bob* is not prideful, not cowardly, not 
vengeful, not a hunchback, never gets hungry, and never tires of listening 
to the harmonic splendor of choirs of angels. Would one think that Bob 
and Bob* are identical? One might well think that something had hap¬
pened to Bob off-screen and that he has been replaced by an imposter. One 
might entertain the hypothesis that mind control is involved or perhaps 
just bad screenwriting. In contrast, if Bob gradually morphed into Bob* 
2 2 C f . John Hick , "Theology and Verification," Theology Today 17 (1960), 12-31. 
2 3 One can also run a similar argument in terms not of the continuity of identity but in 
terms of moral continuity. If one dies in a moral ly imperfect state, and Heaven is a place 
where only the morally perfect can go, then one might think it implausible that one's moral 
status can take this leap without the right k ind of explanatory factor, something that by its 
nature entails moral growth (Cf. Barnard, 314-316). Likewise, if it is morally permissible for 
G o d to transform individuals into morally perfect beings at death, one must wonder w h y 
G o d can't do the same thing for us here and now (Barnard, "Purgatory and the Di lemma of 
Sanctification," 318ff). 
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over the course of the movie, then one would probably accept that Bob 
and Bob* really are the same person. 2 4 
Although there is something to be said for worries having to do wi th 
personal identity, there is also reason to think that the transition into the 
afterlife should be transformative. Exceptional experiences of a positive 
or negative sort can accelerate change in ways that may otherwise seem 
discontinuous to outside observers. It is plausible that one's death and the 
beginning of an afterlife could be an even more transformative experience 
than the events that typically accelerate change i n this life. 
The Protestant who rejects purgatory may do so by citing the many 
Bible verses that seem to indicate that a believer w i l l be enjoying the pres¬
ence of G o d after death and a reprieve f rom the suffering that typifies this 
world. Such characteristics are not easily harmonized wi th an interme-
diate post-mortem state characterized by suffering undertaken to make 
one worthy of being in the presence of God . Jesus tells the thief on the 
cross, "Today you shall be with me in paradise" (Luke 23:43). The Apostle 
Paul writes that while we are here i n the body we are absent f rom the 
L o r d but that when we leave this body, we w i l l be present wi th the L o r d (2 
Cor. 5:8). Revelation depicts a vision of a new earth and a new Jerusalem 
appearing seemingly all at once and ful ly formed. The new Jerusalem is 
a place where there is no crying or pain because "the o ld order of things 
has passed away," which is associated in the previous verse with the o ld 
earth (Rev. 21:3-4). In John, Jesus says he's going to prepare a place for his 
followers and that the transition to their residence in that place w i l l have 
the character of h im personally taking them to be wi th h im "that you may 
be where I am" (John 14:3). A s it is put in Jesus's parable, the good and 
faithful servant is told to "enter into the joy of [his] master" (Matt. 25:21). 
When a Protestant who denies purgatory is pressed to give an account 
of how it could be that people who die as imperfect people could gain 
immediate access to the presence of a perfect God, such a Protestant is 
l ikely to appeal to still more verses that seem to indicate that believers 
w i l l undergo some sort of transformative experience at death. When we 
see him, we shall be like h im for we shall see h i m as he is (I John 3:2). I 
Corinthians says that we shall be "changed—in a flash, in the twinkling of 
an eye" and the result of this change w i l l be the perishable being clothed 
with the imperishable and the mortal wi th immortality (I Cor. 15:52). Simi¬
larly, Philippians talks about waiting for Jesus to come f rom heaven and 
transform our lowly bodies into glorious ones through an exercise of his 
power (Phil 3:21). 
I do not mean to prooftext. Each of these verses could, no doubt, be 
given an interpretation f rom a perspective that is sympathetic to purga¬
tory. The thing to notice, rather, is that there is a substantial and familiar 
body of evidence that suggests that entering the afterlife is transformative, 
involves leaving behind the suffering that typifies life on earth, and has 
2 4See Walls, 114-122, for an extended argument along these lines. 
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the presence of G o d available f rom the get go. In contrast, a central ratio¬
nale for purgatory by the lights of the satisfaction and a more Aristotelian 
sanctification view is that, for one reason or another, one must be kept out¬
side of the bounds of God's heavenly presence because one is unworthy. 
G o d is too holy for a wrongdoer or improperly habituated person to be 
in his presence. Furthermore, on these views, the afterlife does contain 
suffering, maybe even suffering that surpasses that of earth. 
It is hard to see how either the satisfaction or an Aristotelian sanctifica-
tion view could account for the evidence that entering the afterlife is a 
transformative event. O n the alternative sanctification view in particular, 
it does not appear that we are "like H i m when we see H i m . " O n Walls's 
view, for instance, we take up our project of sanctification where we left 
oft on earth because of the continuity between who we were before and 
after death. If entering the afterlife changes the nature of the project in any 
substantive sense, it is unclear how. After all, Walls insists that the limited 
opportunities for sanctification on earth imply that there must be a place 
to finish the sanctification process. I suppose it is open for a more Aristo-
telian view to allow for some change that is relevant to sanctification that 
accompanies one's transition into the afterlife, so long as the change is not 
sufficient to undercut identity. 2 5 To do so, though, would be to open the 
door for questioning whether a purgatory devoted to sanctification is re-
ally necessary. If part of the work of sanctification could be done through 
the transformative events surrounding one's death, why not all of it? It is 
open, on the other hand, for the holder of the satisfaction view to claim 
that entering the afterlife is a deeply transformative event. One could be 
transformed and yet have a debt of punishment to pay. Positing this only 
makes it the more curious that transformed people must be punished be¬
fore they can enter God's presence. 
In contrast, the jet lag model can honor both personal identity and the 
transformative nature of the afterlife. O n the jet lag model, the attribute 
most fundamental to one's perfectability, one's relational stance toward 
God, holds steady across the transition through death into the afterlife. In 
the afterlife, one undergoes a continuous transition that leads ultimately 
to a final state of blessedness. If, as the jet lag model supposes, one's iden-
tity and moral standing is most defined by one's relational stance towards 
the divine, then we have continuity across physical death that should be 
sufficient to guarantee the identity of the pre- and post-mortem person. 
O n the other hand, the jet lag model can draw a principled distinction 
between one's mode of being before and after death such that entering the 
afterlife is an inherently transformative event. The person experiencing 
trans-world jet lag enters into the presence of God . None of the cogni¬
tive barriers that hamper one in a fallen wor ld occlude one's access to the 
divine anymore. Relational dispositions that were partially masked due to 
l iv ing in a fallen wor ld can now be manifested without impediment. One 
2 5 I thank Tom Flint for helping me to see this possibility. 
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has moved, as it were, f rom faith to sight. This transformative experience 
removes the need for any of the tears and sorrow of earth. One enters 
immediately and all at once into a state of blessedness. The only caveat is 
that one's final blessedness awaits fu l l acclimatization to one's new sur¬
roundings. 
Atonement and Double Counting 
One source of concern wi th purgatory for Protestants is the relationship 
between purgatory and the doctrine of the atonement. One rather general 
way of characterizing the worry that is independent of one's theory of 
the atonement is i n terms of double counting. The thought is that Jesus's 
atoning death on the cross is supposed to do something for the believer. 
Whatever the atonement is doing, it is supposed to address one's failure 
to meet the standard necessary for heaven. We're imperfect; we're sin¬
ners. Thus we need a savior. Purgatory, however, looks l ike a solution to 
an identical problem. Purgatory is supposed to be necessary because we 
are imperfect and thus unworthy of heaven. The question, then, becomes 
why we apparently need two solutions to the same problem. Doesn't 
that call into question either the necessity of purgatory or the efficacy of 
the atonement? 
The clearest answer one can give on either the satisfaction or an Aristo-
telian version of the sanctification view is that more than one thing needs 
to happen for one to be worthy of heaven and that the atonement doesn't 
do everything that is necessary. Thus, i n effect, one can avoid double 
counting by having the atonement count for less. Or, more subtly, one 
might suppose that one thing needs to happen but that this one thing has 
an aspect to it that requires purgatory and is not addressed by atonement 
absent purgatorial suffering. 2 6 
O n an Aristotelian version of the sanctification view, one can claim that 
the atonement takes care of the need for punishment, for example, but 
claim that it does not take away the need for moral habituation. After the 
atonement has done its work on someone, she is still unworthy of being 
in God's presence due to lacking the right dispositions. O n the satisfaction 
view, one might claim that atonement is sufficient for G o d to be wi l l ing 
to reinstate one, while still claiming that the atonement is not sufficient to 
nul l i fy the requirement that one suffer punishment for one's sins. There 
are, no doubt, more ways one can develop these views to try to deal wi th 
the problem, but, in each case, avoiding the charge of double counting w i l l 
involve restricting the scope of what the atonement does to remedy one's 
imperfection. 
The jet lag theory has an easy way out of this predicament. O n the jet 
lag view, however the atonement works, its ultimate end should be the 
restoration of relationship wi th the divine. This work is not done by pur¬
gatory. Instead, purgatory is just that time of learning to appropriate that 
2 6 I thank an anonymous referee for d rawing m y attention to this possibility. 
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relationship in fu l l . The relationship is already in place before one enters 
purgatory. Thus, there is no double counting. Sanctification on earth is a 
matter of growing into this relationship, learning to appropriate it and 
live into it wi th in a fallen world . Purgation in the afterlife is a matter of 
doing the same without the obstacles of one's former existence. For both, 
one can claim that the atonement is 100 percent effective i n removing 
the problem of a sundered relationship wi th G o d and replacing it wi th a 
restored relationship. 
One might insist, however, that the appropriation of what the atone¬
ment does for one is facilitated by purgatory. Perhaps we must take an 
active part in the process. We get to participate i n Christ's redemptive ac¬
tivity and thus purgatory is necessary.27 Depending on how it was fleshed 
out, I think there is much to commend a view of the atonement and re¬
demption that allows for active participation. The most attractive way of 
filling this suggestion out, however, is in relational terms, or so I would 
contend. 
When the beloved has taken a broken relationship and made whole 
relationship possible again, one must still respond. One must live into it, 
and one must trust in spite of the fact that doing so can be painful . If the 
account we are using is inherently relational, then we are not forced to 
make a division between what each party is contributing because the rela¬
tion might depend on both of its relata. One can thereby make room for 
the active participation in God's redemption and perfection of the human 
person. In contrast, if one is not using a relational model, it is hard to see 
how the necessity of two distinct processes does not imply that each pro¬
cess is not completely effective at addresing the human condition (at least 
absent overdetermination). Consequently, I take the objection to double 
counting on the grounds that purgatory can be a participation in God's 
redemptive work to be grist for my mi l l . 
The Question of Continuity with the Tradition 
I take the foregoing to be sufficient to motivate the idea that the jet lag 
model of purgatory offers a distinctive way of thinking about purgatory 
that is worth consideration alongside satisfaction models and versions of 
the sanctification model inconsistent wi th it. One might, at this point, be 
concerned that the jet lag theory of purgatory is not continuous enough 
with traditional accounts of such a place to warrant inclusion as a possible 
account of purgatory, however. Whether this is so w i l l i n part have to do 
with what one takes to be necessary for continuity with the tradition and 
what exactly one takes the traditional view of purgatory to include. I w i l l 
not attempt to adjudicate either of these matters here. Instead, I w i l l grant 
that, for many whose tradition includes a doctrine of purgatory, the jet lag 
model may be a nonstarter. I want to claim, however, that there may be 
more continuity here than one might first imagine. 
2 7 I thank an anonymous referee for this objection. 
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When Aquinas speaks of purgatory, he emphasizes that it is a place of 
cleansing and distinguishes cleansing f rom earning merit. 2 8 He says that 
"venial sin prevents one who has charity f rom obtaining the perfect good, 
namely eternal life, until he be cleansed." 2 9 Purgatory isn't supposed to be 
like a cosmic gym where one creates a new and improved soul. The point 
of purgatory is not supposed to be earning God's presence but removing 
obstacles to it. It's more of a detox center than a gym. If you think that 
what one needs to be cleansed of are bad habits, you ' l l say habituation 
happens in purgatory. If you think that penal guilt follows one into the 
afterlife, you ' l l say punishment happens in purgatory. 
If the cleansing of the soul is the heart of the concept, though, then 
one has to ask why it is that one's own efforts or pain would be required 
to remove the stain of sin and make one worthy of God's presence. To 
put the point provocatively, if Pelagianism is unacceptable as an account 
of the life of faith for our earthly life, why would it be more acceptable 
in the next? Why couldn't it be that it is l iving into God's presence itself 
that washes away what needs to be washed away? O n a more relational 
way of looking at things, the blessed in heaven enjoy a state of complete 
union wi th and repose in the divine, and the path to this state is increasing 
degrees of surrender and openness.3 0 If that's right, however, then I think 
the character of any habituation or penance there may be in the afterlife 
changes dramatically. 
In giving voice to the Catholic view of purgatory, Neal Judisch says, 
[P]urgatory is the pur i fy ing and transformative postmortem encounter wi th 
Christ which takes the broken and sick and heals them, making them fit to 
enjoy unsull ied and unending communion wi th G o d and the saints in the 
life everlasting. 3 1 
The inherently relational language of this description accords well 
wi th the model I have been presenting. If one agrees with Judisch that 
this description captures the essence of what purgatory is about, then that 
provides one reason to think that my model is a live option. 
Once again, how sensible the account I've given here appears w i l l 
depend in no small part on one's conception of what human perfection 
consists in . O n a judicial or Aristotelian conception, it may not be worth 
considering, but, on a relational notion of perfection, it is an attractive 
option. 
2 8 Aquinas ST, appendix II, article I, reply to objection i . 
2 9 Aquinas ST, appendix II, article I, reply to objection i i . 
3 0It is noteworthy that in Francis Beckwith's review of Walls's book he cites a number of 
authorities across the Catholic tradition and the language of cleansing runs throughout these 
quotations. Francis Beckwith, "Like It Was Written In M y Soul From M e To You: Assessing 
Jerry Walls ' Crit ique of the Catholic Account of Purgatory," The Heythrop Journal 55 (2013), 
1-12 at 3 ^ . 
3 1 Judisch, "Sanctification, Satisfaction, and Purgatory," 179. 
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In closing, I w i l l point out a hybrid option that some might find ap-
pealing. 3 2 There is a natural way to combine the jet lag model of purgatory 
with a sanctification model of an Aristotelian stripe. The way to do so is 
to think of the habits that need to be formed as relational habits. For those 
who can agree that how a human being relates to goodness is identical 
to how a human being relates to God, there is room to merge the jet lag 
model and even an Aristotelian sanctification model. Characterological 
growth is necessary for proper relatedness, and proper relatedness is the 
frame within which one should understand character formation. This 
hybrid, however, should fundamentally change how we think about the 
sanctification that is going on in purgatory. One should no longer think 
of it on an analogy to physical training and the building of a k ind of free¬
standing moral excellence. Rather, one should think of it as growing into 
a relationship. 
The jet lag model gives us a model of purgatory even more appealing 
and ecumenically acceptable than that which Walls provides on his own. 3 3 
It draws a clear conceptual distinction between hell and purgatory and 
what goes on in each place. It can account for the continuity that under-
girds personal identity across one's entrance into the afterlife while also 
taking into account the transformative nature of the afterlife. Lastly, it 
respects Protestant soteriological concerns while being more continuous 
with traditional conceptions of the function of purgatory than may ini¬
tially appear.3 4 
Azusa Pacific University 
3 2 Walls has an extended discussion in his book of hybrid accounts of purgatory, but these 
are all hybrids of the satisfaction and sanctification models. Thus, they are not applicable 
here. See Walls, 71-82. 
3 3 Al though Walls does not include any inherently relational items in his model , there are 
parts of his book that seem to indicate that Walls might not be constitutionally averse to any 
gloss of sanctification in relational terms Cf. Walls, 85-86. 
3 4 I w o u l d like to thank Jerry Walls, Tom Flint, and two anonymous referees for helpful 
feedback on this essay. 
